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SMOOTH SAILING? NAVIGATING THE SEA OF LAW
APPLICABLE TO THE CRUISE LINE INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
When Merrian Carver disappeared from a cruise ship, the
cruise line donated her belongings to charity, no one notified her
family, and the crew generally acted as though nothing had gone
wrong.' When Annette Mizener vanished from a cruise ship, her
family took the lead role in collecting evidence and securing the
alleged crime scene before a ship security officer baselessly told
them she committed suicide. 2 In the heavily publicized George
Smith case, crew members failed to enter his cabin when respond-
ing to a noise complaint, failed to secure or preserve the alleged
crime scene, and failed to adequately assist his wife after he went
missing from the ship under suspicious circumstances. 3
1. See ABC News, Cruise Cover Up?, http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/print?
id=1541034 (Jan. 26, 2006) (reporting cabin attendant told his boss passenger was
missing and boss did not order search). The cruise line did not readily cooperate
with Ms. Carver's family's investigation, forcing the family to spend thousands of
dollars on a private detective and a lawsuit. See id. (noting cruise line fired cabin
attendant's boss after internal hearing). The cruise line also established an anony-
mous hotline for employees that question the crew's handling of a safety, security,
or environmental issue. See International Maritime Security: Hearing Before the Joint
Subcomms. on Government Reform, National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations, Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 109th Cong. 71 (2005)
[hereinafter Congressional Hearing I] (taking note of cruise line's improved tracking
system that shows whether every passenger in fact disembarked). The particular
cruise line from which Ms. Carver disappeared has not successfully prosecuted any
of the crimes committed on board its ships over the past thirty-five years. See State-
ments Submitted for the Record: International Maritime Security Hearing, http://reform.
house.gov/UploadedFiles/Statements%20for%20Record.pdf (Aug. 1, 2005)
(quoting maritime attorney's statement attached to Carver family statement).
2. See ABC News, Cruise Vanishing: Suicide or Foul Play?, Jan. 26, 2006, http://
abcnews.go.com/Primetime/print?id=1542501 (noting cruise line also stated it
would not continue to look for her "[b] ecause usually the body... sinks before it
floats"). Cruise passengers commonly report their travel companions missing, but
those "missing" passengers are almost always later found on board. See id. (explain-
ing cruise line's procedures).
3. See Alison Leigh Cowan, Bride Recounts Disappearance of Husband During
Cruise, N.Y. TiMEs,Jan. 5, 2006, at BI (revealing cruise line washed away blood after
receiving permission to do so from Turkish officials in port of call). The cruise
line vigorously challenges and defends itself against many of the accusations made
regarding the Smith case. See, e.g., ABC News, Two Sides of the Honeymoon Cruise
Disappearance, Jan. 26, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/print?id=1546815
(reporting captain's assertions that crew secured scene and contacted authorities,
and Turkish police conducted "full forensic investigation" and turned evidence
over to FBI). The facts of the Smith case, if proven true, are egregious: the cruise
line initially did not allow Mrs. Smith to call anyone; told her she had to leave the
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"Watching the news, you'd think cruise-ship passengers getting
lost at sea was an epidemic... ."4 The recent string of highly publi-
cized disappearances on the open seas prompted relatives of miss-
ing cruise passengers to form a group seeking industry reform by
Congress.5 Consequently, in December 2005, Congress held an in-
troductory hearing on international maritime security, focusing for
the first time more on passenger safety rather than on the threat of
terrorism .6
A major problem Congress faces when addressing cruise line
industry safety is that valid safety issues may not exist.7 The only
ship with Turkish police; promised her cruise ship security officer escorts and
failed to provide them; and left her in Turkey with no money, belongings, or plane
ticket home. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 40 (describing Mrs.
Smith's statement submitted for hearing's record and further noting cruise line
showed no compassion, considering twenty-five-year-old newlywed lost her new
husband). In addition, she later allegedly suffered a sexual assault by Turkish po-
lice. See id. Though these allegations have not yet been proven, one Congressman
indicated they may be more likely to be true than not, because Mrs. Smith could
have released her statement and allegations publicly much earlier than she did.
See id. at 41 (noting Congressman's assertion that if she had released information
sooner, cruise line might no longer get any business).
4. Amy Martinez, Missing Cruise Cases Spur Calls for Scrutiny, MIAN HERXLD,
Feb. 12, 2006, available at http://www.lipcon.com/news-article68.shtml (reporting
on cruise industry safety and suggesting cruise lines may downplay incidents to
preserve reputation).
5. See International Cruise Victims Organization, http://www.international
cruisevictims.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2006) (offering victims' stories, support, and
resources for families and friends of those missing at sea); Cruise Bruise, http://
www.cruisebruise.com/index.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2006) (providing extensive
cruise-related resources, including reports of accidents and incidents, cruise indus-
try information, and critique and commentary regarding cruising); John Christof-
fersen, Relatives of Missing Cruise Passengers Form New Group, USA TODAY, Jan. 4,
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2006-01-04-cruise-reform
_x.htm ("The only way [cruise lines are] going to change is by Congress regulating
them." (quoting Smith family's attorney)).
6. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 1, 9 (stating U.S. Representative
Christopher Shays (R-CT) chaired hearing and mentioning heavy focus on terror-
ism until this hearing). Representative Shays called for the hearing after one of his
constituents experienced events similar to those of the Carver family's. See Cruise
Cover Up?, supra note 1 ("Merrian Carver's case just ignites me because I think of
the arrogance of the industry .... In the end, they acted like she was a nonper-
son." (quoting Representative Shays)). Representative Shays analogized the cruise
industry to Las Vegas by noting that what happens on board tends to stay on
board. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 66 (referencing infamous Las
Vegas advertising slogan). The second in the series of hearings took place on
March 7, 2006. See International Maritime Security II: Law Enforcement, Passenger Secur-
ity and Incident Investigation on Cruise Ships: Hearing Before the Committee on Govern-
ment Reform and Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations, 109th Cong. 218 (2006) [hereinafter Congressional Hearing I1] (declaring
further hearings to follow). For a further discussion detailing the second Congres-
sional hearing, see infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
7. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 28 (noting absence of legal re-
quirement that cruise lines report crimes occurring on board ship to any U.S.
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statistics available, which may not provide a completely accurate pic-
ture of the true crime rate aboard cruises, are those the industry
voluntarily reports to the FBI.8 Cruise industry officials estimate
that thirteen people have vanished from cruise ships over the last
two years, and the officials report approximately fifty cruise ship
crimes per year to the FBI.9 Other sources, however, report higher
numbers.10 Despite the discrepancy among the numbers, the
cruise industry claims passengers are safer aboard cruise ships than
in almost any American town." The cruise industry further main-
agency). Additionally, 2,000 people go missing each day in the U.S., as compared
to the thirteen who have reportedly gone missing at sea over the last two years. See
id. at 8 (mentioning that it may be safer to take cruise than to "walk down the
street in any city in America"). This statistic slightly misleads the reader, however,
because when people go missing in the U.S., a crime or serious accident is not
necessarily involved because people can later be located anywhere; whereas on a
cruise ship, there is nowhere else to go, and thus a crime or serious accident is
necessarily implicated. See id. at 39 (positing reasons why someone went missing
from cruise ship include murder, serious accident, or suicide). Cruise lines are
well aware that passengers often drink too much and are not overly concerned
with their own personal safety, which is why ships are carefully designed to protect
passenger safety. See id. at 72, 73 (noting high ship rails prevent accidental falls,
empty swimming pools are covered, and cruise personnel will escort intoxicated
passengers back to their cabins).
8. See id. at 26 (quoting FBI official's statement: "We don't know what they
haven't reported to us. There is no way of knowing."). For example, there are no
available statistics on thefts aboard cruise ships. See id. at 28. "[Y]ou are depend-
ing on the good will of the industry to provide you accurate information." Id. at 38
(quoting Representative Shays and acknowledging it may not be in best interest of
cruise line industry to report crime statistics fully and accurately). But see Congres-
sional Hearing II, supra note 6, at 224 (quoting testimony of Captain William
Wright, senior vice president of Marine Operations for Royal Caribbean Interna-
tional). Captain Wright asserts:
Our policies and training require diligent reporting of alleged crimes to
the FBI and other law enforcement authorities. The FBI has identified for
the cruise line industry those allegations of potential crimes it wants re-
ported. We not only report what the FBI requests, but we often report
additional allegations that fall below FBI thresholds or what otherwise
would not be reported in a landbased environment.
Id.
9. See Christoffersen, supra note 5 (reporting, however, that FBI opened 305
high seas criminal cases over past five years, averaging sixty-one per year). Cruise
personnel find bodies in less than twenty-five percent of the missing person cases,
though most of the reported deaths are on commercial cargo vessels, rather than
cruise ships. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 12 (noting commercial
cargo ships are increasingly subject to pirate attacks motivated by theft). Although
there were nearly 4,000 pirate attacks on commercial ships in 2005, there was only
one known attack on a cruise ship, which crewmembers thwarted. See id. at 48
(stating cruise ships can immediately alert authorities if subject to pirate incident).
10. See 15 Passengers Vanish Since 2004, Mi.mi HERAID, Feb. 12, 2006, at E4
(describing fifteen missing passenger cases since 2004 and noting "details are
scarce").
11. See Christoffersen, supra note 5 (citing accusations that cruise industry
may be covering up foul play to avoid bad publicity in effort to keep its business
2007]
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tains that cruising is the safest way to travel, that it does not ignore
or avoid problems aboard ships, and that it takes every reported
incident seriously by following established protocols. 12 Neverthe-
less, both victims of these crimes and their families often feel that
justice is not delivered by either the industry's handling of these
incidents or by the insufficient legal remedies available. 13
Much to victims' and their families' dismay, there may be very
little the U.S. government can do to address their problems. 14
Cruise line corporations and their ships are not traditionally Ameri-
can-owned or registered; thus, regulating their affairs domestically
may involve U.S. encroachment upon the sovereignty of countries
where the cruise lines are based or where the incidents occur.1 5
The U.S.'s regulation of its own passenger boat industry, however, is
thriving). Importantly, the FBI is not aware of any systemic failure of the cruise
industry to report crimes at sea. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 22
(recognizing U.S. Navy does not maintain statistics on number of acts of piracy at
sea per year).
12. See ABC News, Cruise Line Industry Responds to Critics, Jan. 26, 2006, http://
abcnews.go.com/Primetime/print?id=1547053 ("I think at the end of the day our
record, our procedures will be fully vindicated in this process .... ." (quoting
Michael Crye, president of International Cruise Line Association)).
13. See Christoffersen, supra note 5 (opining failure to see justice done "adds
insult to injury" (quoting George Smith's sister)). "Critics say that it is not about
how often people go missing, but how the cruise lines handle the situation when it
happens." Cruise Line Industry Responds to Critics, supra note 12 (reporting com-
plaints center on cruise officials' failure to respond quickly to incident reports,
failure to take such reports seriously, and failure to stop boat and search for miss-
ing person). "All they had to do [was] acknowledge the crime was committed.
They couldn't probably solve the crime. You had a right to expect them to make a
good faith effort." Congressional Hearing II, supra note 6, at 135-36 (quoting Repre-
sentative Shays, who directed his comments to Ira Leonard, passenger who exper-
ienced sizeable theft while on board cruise ship). Representative Shays asserted
that had the cruise line treated Mr. Leonard with respect rather than adding to his
misery, it may have won him back as a customer. See id. For a further discussion
detailing the cruise industry's current procedures to respond to criminal incidents
and missing person reports, see infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion detailing the lack of legal remedies available domestically, see
infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the lack of available American remedies, see
infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
15. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 7 ("Once we get into the com-
plicated conflict of laws area, have mercy on us." (quoting Congresswoman Nor-
ton)). For example, in the Smith case, the cruise line contacted the FBI because
an American citizen was the victim, Turkish authorities because the ship docked in
Turkey after the alleged crime, Greek authorities because the crime may have oc-
curred in Greece's waters, and Bahamian authorities because the ship is registered
in the Bahamas. See id. at 58-59 (noting response to each incident is determined
on case by case basis). For a further discussion on the applicability of U.S. law to
cruise ships, see infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
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relatively sparse. 16 The U.S. acknowledges that it focuses its security
efforts on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction at domestic
ports, rather than on general passenger safety and common crimes,
such as theft and assault. 17 Ultimately, American cruise passengers
simply should not expect either protection by U.S. law wherever
they travel or protection by law enforcement at all, much less in a
timely manner.18 "Even when the law is clear, the effective reach of
U.S. authority depends on the willingness and ability of cruise ship
operators to make security a visible priority, recognize and report
incidents, preserve evidence, and conduct thorough on board
investigations."19
This Comment intends to provide a familiarity with the cruise
industry's origins and the development of its governing law as a use-
16. See Timothy Egan, In Indicting Boat's Captain, U.S. Tries to Send a Message,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A14 (describing rarely used 154-year-old statute meant
to hold boat captains liable for unsafe operation of their boats when passenger
death results). "When captains operate their boats unsafely and people are killed,
they must be held accountable." Id. (quoting federal prosecutor's announcement
of charges in case against allegedly negligent small boat captain). Over the last
century, the law has not been utilized more than a dozen times, even though there
have been countless deaths at sea, many due to the negligence of captains. See id.
(describing boating accidents and areas of U.S. waters known as dangerous).
Holding a domestic small boat captain liable for passenger deaths may indicate
that the U.S. would like to prosecute these incidents more vigorously, whether they
happen at home or abroad. See id. (noting federal authorities are sending message
to thousands of boat operators that they can be punished for negligence resulting
in death at sea). For a further discussion of the U.S.'s reputation within the inter-
national cruise industry, see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
17. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 9, 46 (mentioning U.S. has 539
ports and that cruise lines use many more ports globally). The FBI and the Coast
Guard are jointly responsible for the U.S.'s maritime jurisdiction. See id. at 10
(commending International Council of Cruise Ship Lines for maintaining high
safety standards within industry). For a further discussion on the International
Council of Cruise Ship Lines, see infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
18. See id. at 3, 54 (quoting congressional representative's assertion that most
people assume there is uniform standard of law that applies to cruise ships despite
fact that passengers know cruise ships visit other countries); see also DR. R.
NIcHOLAS PALARINO & PAT DEQUATrTRO, STAFF OF S. COMMS. ON NATIONAL SECUR-
iTY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 109TH CONG., BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR
HEARING ON INrERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURIY at 10-12, Dec. 8, 2005, available at
http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Memo%20MARITIME.pdf [hereinafter
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM] ("American passengers... should be aware that the U.S.
government may not be able to come to their assistance in a timely manner....
[R]eporting a crime on board.., does not mean anything will be done or that a
crime will be investigated. Passengers should be made aware of these issues.").
19. Congressional Hearing II, supra note 6, at 1, 2 (quoting Representative
Shays). "Even attorneys find it difficult to navigate the complex jurisdictional
boundaries, statutory definitions, treaty provisions, maritime traditions, and fine-
print liability disclaimers." Id. (quoting Representative Shays). For a further dis-
cussion of the law and regulations governing the cruise industry, see infra notes 42-
106 and accompanying text.
2007]
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ful starting point in understanding the current controlling law.20
Section II provides a brief history of the cruise industry.2' Section
III offers an overview of the law applicable to the industry.22 Sec-
tion IV details the recent Congressional hearings regarding cruise
lines.23 Additionally, this Comment offers possible courses of ac-
tion the U.S. government could take to expand its influence over
the industry and to help ensure the safety of American passen-
gers.24 Finally, Section V summarizes this Comment. 25
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRUISE LINE INDUSTRY
Cargo ships offered the first passenger voyages, simultaneously
catering to passengers' comfort while transporting goods.2 6 By the
1830s, English companies, making luxurious steamships the norm,
led the fledgling cruise industry.2 7 The year 1844 is considered the
true beginning of the pleasure cruise industry, and throughout the
1850s and 1860s, companies began to make ships more luxurious
and to focus solely on passengers' comfort and enjoyment.28 By the
early 1900s, Germany led the industry by developing superliners
comparable to "massive and ornate floating hotels."29 The pinnacle
20. For a further discussion of the cruise industry's development and its appli-
cable law and regulations, see infra notes 26-106 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion providing the cruise industry's history, see infra
notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion tracing the law and regulations that govern the
cruise industry, see infra notes 42-106 and accompanying text.
23. For an overview of the December 2005 congressional hearing on interna-
tional maritime security, see infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text. For an
overview of the March 2006 congressional hearing on international maritime se-
curity, see infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion providing possible measures the U.S. could take
to more fully protect American passengers at sea, see infra notes 132-83 and accom-
panying text.
25. For a further discussion summarizing the main points of this Comment,
see infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
26. See Lydia Boyd, Brief History of the Passenger Ship Industry, http://scriptori
um.lib.duke.edu/adaccess/ship-history.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (recount-
ing that in 1818 New York's Black Ball Line shipping company first provided regu-
larly scheduled service from U.S. to England and catered to pass6ngers' comfort).
27. See, e.g., id. (describing one ship that left Liverpool and supplied passen-
gers with fresh milk from cow on board).
28. See id. (emphasizing "dramatic improvement in the quality of the voyage
for passengers" through implementation of electric lights, increased deck space,
and entertainment).
29. Id. (portraying elegance of new superliners that minimized discomfort as-
sociated with ocean travel, offered planned activities, and began tradition of dress-
ing formally for dinner).
[Vol. 14: p. 127
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of the industry's early history was without a doubt the well-docu-
mented Titanic disaster in 1912.30
After that, World Wars I and II both interrupted the manufac-
ture of new ships, while countries used existing ships to transport
troops.31 The majority of today's cruise lines and ships are not
American-owned, perhaps because the U.S. halted transatlantic
cruises during World War II, which allowed European lines to take
control.3 2 After the war, the U.S. government re-entered the indus-
try by subsidizing cruise ship building.33 Nevertheless, by 1958,
cruise lines found themselves bankrupt because airlines took con-
trol of the travel industry.34
The modern cruise industry emerged in the 1960s as the focus
shifted from traveling for the purpose of reaching a destination to
simply enjoying the voyage itself.35 "The ship [became] the destina-
tion. '36 Cruise lines, diverging from the industry's earlier affluence
and glamour, began to market more affordable vacation cruises
with a "fun ship" image.3 7 Today, the entertainment available on
board cruise ships ranges from gambling to karaoke to art auc-
30. See generally GEOFF TIBBALLS, THE TITANIc: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF
THE "UNSINKABLE" SHIP (Carlton Books Ltd. 1997) (recounting entire Titanic odys-
sey). Over 3,000 books exist about the Titanic. See id. at 7 (elaborating upon
strength of Titanic story and legend); see also Titanic Sinks Four Hours After Hitting
Iceberg; 866 Rescued by Capathia, Probably 1250 Perish; Ismay Safe, Mrs. Astor Maybe,
Noted Names Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1912, at Al (reporting Titanic's sinking
and providing partial list of those saved).
31. See Boyd, supra note 26 (observing years between two World Wars were
most fashionable and glamorous for cruise lines, catering mostly to rich and
famous).
32. See id. (remarking that European lines carried war refugees from Europe
and business travelers and tourists to Europe during wars). For a further discus-
sion detailing the current cruise industry and the relatively minor U.S. participa-
tion, see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
33. See id. (citing lack of American-owned cruise ships and resulting loss of
profits from industry as justification for subsidization).
34. See id. (explaining that transatlantic business for cruise lines declined as
non-stop flights to Europe took over).
35. See id. (referring to rise of Caribbean vacations, more casual atmosphere
on board ships, and increased affordability of voyages).
36. International Maritime Organization, Larger Ships, New Safety Challenges,
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic-id=473 (last visited Sept.
13, 2006) [hereinafter Larger Ships] (describing length of modem cruise ship as
equivalent to Eiffel Tower "tipped on its side," with combined passenger and crew
capacity equivalent to that of small town).
37. See Boyd, supra note 26 (stating popular TV show "The Love Boat," which
aired from late 1970s to mid-1980s, exemplified cruise lines' new image). One
cruise line's slogan actually is "The Fun Ships." See Carnival Cruise Lines, http://
www.carnivalcruiselines.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2006) (displaying slogan on
cruise line's home page).
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tions.38 Cruise lines engage in an ongoing battle to outdo each
other with bigger, more luxurious, and more entertaining ships
with each new addition to their fleets. 3 9 " [C] ruise ship owners cre-
ate a concept and then set out to sell it."40 The number of passen-
gers departing from U.S. ports increased four and a half percent in
the first nine months of 2005 compared to that same period in
2004, confirming the ever-growing popularity of cruises. 4'
III. Law GovERNING THE CRUISE INDUSTRY
International law and self-regulation largely govern the cruise
industry.4 2 There is little U.S. law directed toward the cruise indus-
try.43 This is perhaps surprising, given how much business cruise
38. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Your Daily Guide to Fun, Nov. 30, 2005, http://
www.carnival.com/CMS/Images/OnboardExperience/sample-capers.pdf (pro-
viding sample listing of daily activities available on board, including golf lessons,
Broadway revues, spa services, and passenger games); see also Disney Cruise Line,
Entertainment, http://Disneycruise.disney.go.com/dcl/en-US/onboard/entertain
ment/ landing?name=OnboardEntertainmentLandingPage (last visited Sept. 24,
2006) (describing entertainment offered on board Disney cruises). Disney's
cruises perhaps epitomize the modern cruise line industry's synonymic relation-
ship with pure entertainment. See id. (detailing live shows, opportunity to meet
Disney characters, nightclubs, and poolside movies available on board cruises).
39. See Royal Caribbean's New Ship: Think Big, Really Big, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 3322699 (reporting Royal Caribbean cruise line's
new ship as too big to fit in many ports, with on board water park where passengers
can surf).
40. Larger Ships, supra note 36 (illustrating how cruise ships differ from cargo
ships because cargo ships are built in response to market needs whereas cruise
ships are built to create market demand).
41. See U.S. Maritime Administration, Cruise Passenger Traffic Shows Continued
Growth, Jan. 5, 2006, http://www.marad.dot.gov/Headlines/2006/cruise%20stats
%20final.htm (noting eighteen and one-half percent increase from over same
2003 period); see also U.S. Maritime Administration, Summary Tables 2003-2006,
http://www.marad.dot.gov/maradstatistics/2005%20CRUISE%2OUPDATE/
Cruise%20Data%202003%20-%202006.xls (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (supplying
extensive statistics on cruises by departure port, passengers by departure port,
cruises by cruise line, passengers by cruise line, passenger-nights by cruise line,
cruises by destination, passengers by destination, cruises by cruise length, and pas-
sengers by cruise length).
42. See generally International Maritime Organization, Introduction to IMO,
http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic-id=3 (last visited Sept. 17,
2006) (providing overview of International Maritime Organization's history and
purposes and explaining United Nations established it through convention). For a
further discussion setting forth the relevant international law, see infra notes 49-73
and accompanying text. For a further discussion describing the industry's internal
regulation, see infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
43. For a further discussion detailing the minimal U.S. law applicable to the
cruise industry and the problems this has created for some American cruise pas-
sengers, see infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
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lines conduct involving Americans.44 Section A reviews the relevant
international maritime law. 4 5 Section B examines the relevant do-
mestic law applicable to ships at sea.46 Section B also explores the
apparent lack of domestic legal remedies available for either victims
or their families. 47 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Section
C sets forth the cruise industry's own internal standards and
regulations. 48
A. International Maritime Law
International maritime law applies to the cruise industry be-
cause cruise ships sail in the waters of many countries, as well as in
the waters of no country, otherwise known as the high seas.49 The
United Nations's International Maritime Organization ("IMO")
monitors and regulates international commercial and passenger
shipping.50 The IMO's primary purpose is "to provide machinery
for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds
affecting shipping engaged in international trade [and to] en-
courage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practica-
44. See, e.g., William B. Ebersold, Reference Section to Cruise Industry in Figures, in
BUSINEss BRIEFING: GLOBAL CRUISE 2004 1 (Touch Briefings 2004). North Ameri-
cans comprised approximately seventy-eight percent of the estimated 11,000,000 to
12,000,000 total cruise passengers in 2003. See id. at 2-4 (observing 3,840 North
American cruises set sail in 2003 and that in 2002, roughly one in forty North
Americans went on cruise). The cruise industry contributed an estimated $20.4
billion to the U.S. economy in 2002, which is notable considering the relatively few
American-owned cruise companies. See id. at 4-5 (noting industry maintained over
eight percent passenger growth rate per year over last two decades); see also ICCL,
International Maritime Organization FAQ http://www.iccl.org/faq/imo.cfm (last vis-
ited Sept. 17, 2006) (mentioning that over ninety percent of ships visiting U.S.
ports are registered outside U.S.). Over the last forty years, the number of ships
registered in the U.S. dropped significantly. See id. (imparting that two countries
with most ships registered are Panama and Liberia).
45. For a further discussion setting forth current international maritime law
governing the cruise industry, see infra notes 49-73 and accompanying text.
46. For a further discussion summarizing the relevant U.S. maritime law, see
infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
47. For a further discussion addressing why victims and their families have
trouble suing cruise lines, see infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
48. For a further discussion on the cruise line industry's rather extensive self-
regulation, see infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
49. For a further discussion on jurisdiction over the high seas, see infra notes
49-73 and accompanying text. Cruise lines collectively visit over 1,800 ports world-
wide. See ICCL, Cruise Industry FAQs, http://www.iccl.org/faq/cruising.cfm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2006) (noting cruise ships sail seven seas and visit all corners of
earth).
50. See Introduction to IMO, supra note 42 (recounting United Nations estab-
lished International Maritime Organization ("IMO") in 1948, which became effec-
tive in 1958 and first convened in 1959).
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ble standards in matters concerning maritime safety . . . ."51 Its
slogan is "[s] afe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans. 5 2
To achieve its objectives, the IMO initiated over forty international
conventions, protocols, agreements, and amendments, and it now
focuses on updating them as the need for new conventions slows.53
Adopting international treaties is worthless unless the signatory
governments effectuate them.54 The IMO adopts legislation that
individual signatory governments must implement.55 For example,
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("Conven-
tion") replaced the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine, which had lim-
ited a country's control of the ocean to the area immediately
surrounding its coastline. 56 The Freedom of the Seas Doctrine,
stemming from the 1600s, eventually resulted in nations dividing
the oceans and competing fiercely for their vast resources, as well as
for control of the oceans themselves; in short, before the Conven-
tion, tension over ocean ownership created a setting constantly ripe
for war. 57 The Convention is virtually all-encompassing, including
provisions on naval power, maritime commerce, interests of coun-
tries with coastal land, marine environment protection, research,
and international dispute settlement.58 The Convention is unique
51. United Nations Convention on the International Maritime Organization,
Mar. 17, 1958, 9 U.S.T. 621, Art. 1 (a) [hereinafter Convention]; see also Introduction
to IMO, supra note 42 (stating secondary purpose is to prevent and control pollu-
tion from ships).
52. IMO, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.
asp?topicid=774 (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (indicating IMO's conventions apply
to over ninety-eight percent of world's commercial ship tonnage).
53. See IMO, Conventions, http://www.imo.org/Conventions/index.asp?
topic-id=148 (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (stating IMO has six bodies responsible
for developing conventions, but all members of United Nations are invited to par-
ticipate equally).
54. See Introduction to IMO, supra note 42 (remarking that process of effecting
treaties is different in each country, but IMO has power to monitor governments'
actions).
55. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 52 (noting IMO does not imple-
ment legislation because member governments are responsible for making con-
ventions part of their national law and enforcing them).
56. See The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspec-
tive, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention-histori
cal-perspective.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Convention: Historical
Perspective] (describing circumstances that led to development of Convention and
summarizing important provisions).
57. See id. ("The oceans were generating a multitude of claims, counterclaims
and sovereignty disputes.").
58. See id. (listing and describing key provisions of Convention: setting limits,
navigation, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, deep seabed mining, ex-
ploitation regime, technological prospects, universal participation in Convention,
pioneer investors, protecting marine environment, marine scientific research, and
settlement of disputes).
[Vol. 14: p. 127
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol14/iss1/4
CRUISE LINE INDUSTRY LAW
because signatory countries must accept it as a whole, including the
provision governing dispute settlement. 59 Normally, the protocol
governing dispute settlement under a particular treaty is a separate
agreement that signatories can choose to accept or decline. 60
Under the Convention, coastal states may enforce any domes-
tic law within twelve nautical miles of their shoreline and any police
powers within twenty-four nautical miles. 61 The IMO requires all
ships engaged in international trade to have a country of registry in
order to sail in international waters. 62 A ship is considered the ter-
ritory of the country in which it is registered, but other countries
may assert jurisdiction over the ship as well depending on the
circumstances. 63
Notably, the U.S. is not a party to the Convention. 64 The U.S.
chose not to become a member primarily because it disagreed with
59. See id. (noting Convention is "unprecedented attempt by the international
community to regulate all aspects of the resources of the sea and uses of the ocean,
and thus bring a stable order to [human]kind's very source of life"). Some of the
more important provisions of the treaty govern
[n]avigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic jurisdiction, legal
status of resources on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion, passage of ships through narrow straits, conservation and manage-
ment of living marine resources, protection of the marine environment, a
marine research regime and . . . a binding procedure for settlement of
disputes between [countries].
Id. (stating International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea controls dispute settle-
ment under Convention).
60. See id. (describing Convention's dispute settlement provision and empha-
sizing novel approach of combining direct negotiations between countries in-
volved with resort to third party dispute settlement only if necessary).
61. See Convention: Historical Perspective, supra note 56 (explaining Convention
only creates rights for signatory countries who also must accept obligations under
Convention, with exception of those rights considered customary international
law).
62. See ICCL, International Maritime Industry: Background and Facts, http://www.
iccl.org/faq/imi.cfm (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Background and Facts]
("[M]ost countries, including the U.S., provide these registration services or flags
of registry."). A "flag state" is a country where the ship is registered; it must be a
member of the IMO, adopt all of the IMO's Conventions and Resolutions regard-
ing maritime safety, and have "an established maritime organization that is capable
of enforcing all international and national regulations." Id. (mentioning most flag
registries monitor compliance with international and national standards and re-
quire annual ship inspections).
63. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 73 (observing, for example,
place of ticket sale may impact rights and responsibilities of ship and passengers, in
addition to other factors). For a further discussion of the factors affecting jurisdic-
tion over a ship, see infra notes 66 and 134 and accompanying text.
64. See BRIEFING MEMORANDUM, supra note 18, at 3 ("[The Convention is] de-
signed to allow freedom of the seas and establishment of a country's maritime
boundaries."). Some members of Congress assert that signing the Convention
would interfere with the U.S.'s sovereignty. See BRIEFING MEMORANDUM Attach-
ments: International Maritime Security Hearing, 4, Dec. 8, 2005, available at http://
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the provisions of the Convention regarding deep seabed mining.65
Because it did not sign the Convention, the U.S. must utilize cus-
tomary international law, rather than treaty law, when asserting its
jurisdiction beyond its territorial waters. 66 The U.S. relies on five
general principles under which a country may assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction: (1) objective territorial, (2) nationality, (3) protective,
(4) passive personality, and (5) universality. 67
One international convention the U.S. did sign is the Interna-
tional Convention for Safety of Life at Sea ("SOLAS Conven-
tion"). 68 This convention was developed in 1914 in response to the
Titanic tragedy, with the most recent version adopted in 1974 and
amended in 2006.69 The SOLAS Convention covers on-board fire
safety, ship construction, life-saving equipment, radio communica-
reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/MARITOOO.pdf (summarizing various criticisms
of Convention).
65. See Marjorie Ann Browne, IB95010: The Law of the Sea Convention and U.S.
Policy, Issue Brief for Congress, Feb. 14, 2001, available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRS
reports/Marine/mar-16.cfm (detailing U.S.'s main contentions with Convention
upon Senate's reconsideration of ratification in 2001).
66. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting Chris Swecker, Assis-
tant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (summarizing principles under
which U.S. may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction). Along with his testimony, Mr.
Swecker also submitted a useful table summarizing the primary circumstances
under which the FBI will investigate an alleged crime that occurred beyond the
U.S. territorial waters. See id. at 10 (explaining which country has jurisdiction
under given set of facts). The table has been reproduced herein as Appendix A.
67. See id. at 4 (elaborating upon customary international maritime law). In
preparation for a hearing, Mr. Swecker answered the following question posed by
the Congressional subcommittees: "What international and national laws pertain
to security of Americans onboard ships traveling outside U.S. territorial waters?"
1) the objective territorial principle - where the offense occurs in one
country but has effects on another (for example, killing someone by
shooting across an international border);
2) the nationality principle - where the offender is a citizen of the prose-
cuting [nation];
3) the protective principle - where the offense threatens the vital inter-
ests of the prosecuting [nation] (for example, acts of terror);
4) the passive personality principle - where the victim is a citizen of the
prosecuting [nation]; and
5) the universality principle - where the offense is universally con-
demned by the international community, sometimes in a multina-
tional convention or treaty to which the United States is a signatory
(piracy would be one such example).
Id. at 2, 4.
68. See International Maritime Organization FAQ supra note 44 (noting Congress
ratified SOLAS Convention and implemented its requirements).
69. See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 32 U.S.T. 47,
Nov. 1, 1974 (supplying treaty language); see also IMO, International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea, http://www.imo.org/Safety/contents.asp?topicid=257&doc
_id=647 (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) [hereinafter IMO SOLAS] (opining SOLAS
Convention may be most important treaty protecting ship safety); IMO, IMO Adopts
Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures, http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/main-
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tion, navigation safety, cargo, dangerous goods, nuclear ships, and
maritime safety and security.70 Chapter XI-1 of the SOLAS Conven-
tion contains a provision requiring ships to maintain an on-board
record denoting the ship's flag state, the owner's state, and other
pertinent information making it easier to quickly determine which
country's or countries' laws apply to the ship. 71 Chapter XI-2 of the
SOLAS Convention, which addresses port security, is particularly
relevant to passengers' personal safety.7 2 It also grants the ship's
captain sole discretion in maintaining the ship's security when nec-
essary and governs the delay, detention, or expulsion of a ship from
port.
7 3
B. Domestic Maritime Law
The U.S. claims jurisdiction over certain matters normally con-
trolled by individual states, specifically regarding crimes occurring
within U.S.-governed waters.7 4 In the United States Criminal Code
section entitled Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the
United States, the U.S. also assumes jurisdiction over crimes by or
against its citizens occurring anywhere not under the jurisdiction of
another country.75 The U.S. further assumes jurisdiction, to the ex-
tent permitted by international law, over crimes committed by or
against its citizens aboard ships with a scheduled arrival or depar-
ture from within its territory.76 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
the principles set forth in this section of the Code.7 7 The cruise
industry recognizes the U.S. for its strict compliance with and en-
frame.asp?topic-id=583&doc-id=2689 (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (describing new
security regime effective in 2004).
70. See IMO SOLAS, supra note 69 (noting SOLAS Convention also covers
management for safe operation of ships, safety measures for high-speed crafts, and
additional safety measures for bulk carriers).
71. See IMO Adopts Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures, supra note 69 (stat-
ing record would contain ship's history and must be kept current).
72. See id. (explaining provision would apply to passenger ships).
73. See IMO SOLAS, supra note 69 (mentioning Chapter XI-2 also covers ship
companies' specific responsibility).
74. See Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States, 18
U.S.C.A. § 7 (2001) (setting forth special circumstances under which U.S.'s juris-
diction may supersede individual states').
75. See id. § 7(7) ("Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with re-
spect to an offense by or against a national of the United States.").
76. See id. § 7(8). The law specifically states that it does not trump any con-
flicting international treaty. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 2006).
77. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 159 (1933) ("In the absence of
any controlling treaty provision, and any assertion ofjurisdiction by the territorial
sovereign, it is the duty of the... United States to apply to offenses committed by
its citizens on [its] vessels . . . ,its own statutes, interpreted in the light of recog-
nized principles of international law.").
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forcement of the industry's regulatory standards, perhaps in light of
the ever-present threat of terrorism. 78
Adding to the troubles of victims and their families is their fre-
quent inability to sue cruise lines in the U.S. court of their choice. 79
When cruise passengers purchase a ticket, they may not realize that
they are automatically agreeing to the cruise line's forum selection
clause and often to a limited timeframe in which to bring suit.80
Contracts such as these, offered by a party with stronger bargaining
power to a weaker party with no opportunity to negotiate the terms,
are called adhesion contracts. 81 U.S. courts uphold forum selection
clauses if: (1) they are reasonable; (2) the contract is not fraudu-
lently induced; and (3) the passenger is given the opportunity to
reject the contract. 82 Courts, however, will not uphold clauses limit-
ing the cruise line's liability for negligence or infliction of emo-
tional distress if the cruise line's negligence caused the injury.83
78. See Background and Facts, supra note 62 (noting U.S. Coast Guard's quar-
terly inspection of all ships picking up passengers in U.S. ports, and that U.S.'s
strict standards are why majority of U.S.-controlled shipping companies choose to
register under other countries' flags). "As new threats against American citizens
and American interests emerge in the post-September 11th era, we ask how effec-
tively [current maritime law] protects the lives, rights, and property of those travel-
ing in international waters." Congressional Hearing II, supra note 6, at 1 (quoting
Representative Shays). But see Egan, supra note 16 (describing U.S.'s history of
lenient regulation of small domestic passenger boats). For a further discussion
proposing that the U.S. focuses on terrorism rather than general passenger safety,
see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
79. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595-97 (1991) (up-
holding forum selection clauses on cruise tickets). Commentators have thor-
oughly addressed this particular issue, and thus it is only briefly addressed herein.
See generally Richard A. Gantner, Note, Contracts - Forum Selection - Absent Bad Faith,
Fraud or Overreaching, a Reasonable Forum Selection Clause in a Commercial Cruise Form
Contract is Enforceable - Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991), 22
SETON HALL L. REv. 505 (1992) (noting forum selection clauses will be sustained
despite conspicuous lack of equal bargaining power between parties); Jeffrey A.
Liesemer, Note, Carnival's Got the Fun . . .and the Forum: A New Look at Choice-of-
Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability Doctrine After Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 53 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1025 (1992) (arguing policies favoring presumptive valid-
ity of forum selection clauses are inapplicable to consumer standard form
contracts).
80. See Kim Jefferies, Personal Jurisdiction and Contractual Forum Selection in Mar-
itime Personal Injury Cases, 7 U.S.F. MaR. L.J. 139, 147 (1994) (stating forum selec-
tion clauses and shortened time periods within which to bring suit are "common
ticket clauses").
81. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 597, 600 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(questioning validity of adhesion contracts because weaker party may not necessa-
rily consent to terms knowingly and voluntarily).
82. See id. at 595 ("[F]orum selection clauses ... are subject to judicial scru-
tiny for fundamental fairness.").
83. See Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability, 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183c (1996)
(stating such clauses violate public policy and thus are null and void).
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Unfortunately for passengers, the Supreme Court upheld a forum
selection clause requiring plaintiffs to litigate on the other side of
the country, regardless of whether it was practical for the particular
plaintiff(s) involved. 84
If the plaintiff still decides to sue the cruise line, the Death on
the High Seas by Wrongful Act is one federal statute that may pro-
vide relief.8 5 This Act allows the decedent's representative to bring
suit against the responsible ship, person, or corporation for the
benefit of the decedent's immediate family and dependent rela-
tives.8 6 Under the Act, plaintiffs may recover actual damages
caused by the death and possibly punitive damages.8 7 Importantly,
any contributory negligence on the decedent's part may limit the
available recovery.8 8 Also, the decedent's family must bring suit
within three years of the date when the cause of action accrued. 89
The following are some basic legal principles U.S. courts apply
in cases involving cruise ships. First, federal maritime law governs,
interprets, and enforces cruise tickets because they are considered
maritime contracts. 90 Second, a court might not enforce a choice
of law provision selecting a foreign country's law as the law gov-
erning a dispute under an adhesion contract; this is especially true
when there are significant contacts with the U.S. entitling the court
to apply U.S. law. 91 Third, a ship owner has a duty to all lawful
passengers and their guests to provide reasonable protection from
84. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587-88, 596-97 (upholding forum se-
lection clause designating Florida even though plaintiffs lived in Washington state
and despite defendant cruise line arguably having sufficient contacts with Wash-
ington to support its personal jurisdiction over cruise line).
85. See 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 761-768 (2000) (covering, but applying somewhat dif-
ferently to, both passengers and crewmembers).
86. See id. § 761 (a) (setting forth federal right of action for death at sea).
This particular section applies when the victim's death occurred beyond the U.S.'s
territorial waters and was caused by an intentional tort or negligence. See id. (de-
fining U.S.'s territorial waters as one "marine league" beyond shoreline).
87. See id. § 762(a)-(b) (barring punitive damages for aviation accidents at
sea, but otherwise silent on punitive damages for wrongful death by other means).
88. See Contributory Negligence, 46 U.S.C. § 766 (2000) (stating contributory
negligence does not bar suit but limits recovery proportionately).
89. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a (instructing that limitation applies unless law
specifies otherwise). For a further discussion on how cruise lines shorten the stat-
ute of limitations in order to reduce the number of suits brought against them, see
supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted) (affirming federal law preemption of state law).
91. See, e.g., Mulvihill v. Furness, Withy & Co., 136 F. Supp. 201, 205-06
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (" [I] t may not be assumed that the parties' choice of law will auto-
matically foreclose this Court from applying another law .... ").
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danger.9 2 Finally, unfortunately for many of the victims' families,
the mere fact that an accident occurred, without more, is insuffi-
cient to sustain a negligence claim against a ship's owner. 93
C. Cruise Line Industry Self-Regulation
All of the major cruise lines are members of the International
Council of Cruise Lines ("ICCL"), a trade group representing the
industry's positions and interests to various lawmakers, policymak-
ers, and industry partners.94 The ICCL, a non-governmental organ-
ization, actively participates in the IMO's decision-making
process. 95 The organization asserts that cruise ships are "compara-
ble to a secure building with a 24 hour security guard."' 96 Cruise
lines, in order to ensure both that they generate accurate records of
who is on board and that only authorized persons gain access to the
ship, issue all passengers and crewmembers identification cards that
92. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630
(1959) (citing Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1881)) ("It is a settled principle
of maritime law that a shipowner owes the duty of exercising reasonable care to-
wards those lawfully aboard the vessel who are not members of the crew.").
93. See, e.g., Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir.
1996) (citing Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 84 A.2d 281, 284 (N.J. 1951)) (de-
ciding negligence must be proven, rather than presumed, unless res ipsa loquitor
doctrine applies).
94. See ICCL, Who We Are, http://www.iccl.org/whoweare/index.cfm [herein-
after Who We Are] (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) (describing ICCL's activities in U.S.,
international representation, and effect on U.S. economic growth). "The mission
of the International Council of Cruise Lines ["ICCL"] is to participate in the regu-
latory and policy development process and promote all measures that foster a safe,
secure and healthy cruise ship environment." Id. (listing areas of focus, including
safety, public health, security, passenger protection, and legislative activities).
ICCL members include the Carnival, Celebrity, Disney, Princess, and Royal Carib-
bean cruise lines. See ICCL, Cruise Line Members, http://www.iccl.org/clmembers/
index.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) (providing hyperlinks to each member
cruise line's individual website).
95. See Who We Are, supra note 94 (listing conventions ICCL helped develop
and promote).
96. The Safest Way to Travel: Cruise Ship Security, http://www.iccl.org/press-
room/securityfinal.pdf [hereinafter The Safest Way to Travel] (last visited Sept. 16,
2006) (remarking official registry of passengers and crewmembers strictly controls
access to ship). Passengers and crewmembers may only leave or board the cruise
ship after passing through strict security. See id. (describing use of photo identifi-
cation and screening of passengers, crewmembers, and baggage). Further, cruise
lines screen crewmembers prior to employment, and the U.S. embassy conducts
background checks before granting work visas to non-American employees. See id.
(pointing out that many cruise lines' heightened security procedures were in place
before September 11, 2001 attacks against U.S.). But see Congressional Hearing II,
supra note 6, at 149 (quoting testimony of Brett Rivkind, maritime attorney, and
stating crewmembers secretly pay off cruise line agents in different countries to
gain employment without conducting or passing background check).
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they must present upon leaving or boarding the ship.97 Many
cruise lines prohibit passengers from receiving visitors on board al-
together. 98 Additionally, cruise ships and ports have formal security
plans that the U.S. Coast Guard must approve. 99
In 1999, the ICCL adopted a zero tolerance industry standard
against crimes committed aboard cruise ships. 100 The ICCL's secur-
ity committee consists of its member cruise lines' security directors
and meets bimonthly with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to discuss security. 10' Each ICCL member cruise ship has
a team of security personnel headed by a lead security officer, many
of whom have military or law enforcement backgrounds. 10 2 The
U.S. Coast Guard approved the ICCL's protocols that allow ships to
quickly increase their security measures when necessary.' 03 When a
crime may have occurred aboard a ship, the current policy requires
the crew to secure the scene, preserve evidence, and contact law
enforcement authorities. 0 4 Specifically, in missing person cases,
the policy is to page the person, search the ship if neither the per-
son nor a passenger with knowledge of the person's whereabouts
responds to the page, and finally notify the U.S. Coast Guard if the
97. See, e.g., Congressional Hearing II, supra note 6, at 239 (quoting testimony of
Captain William Wright, senior vice president of Marine Operations for Royal Car-
ibbean International, describing Royal Caribbean's 'SeaPass' system as example of
security measure beyond what law requires).
98. See, e.g., Royal Caribbean International, What to Know Before You Go, http:/
/www.royalcaribbean.com/beforeyouboard/travelGuidelines.do-jsessionid=0000
Yhx5CAruyd6PHxcrdgBsfy3:10kohi76p?cS=NAVBAR (last visited Sept. 25, 2006)
(barring passengers' visitors from boarding ship at any port for security reasons).
99. See The Safest Way to Travel, supra note 96 (describing U.S. port security as
comparable to that of airports').
100. See ICCL, Open Letter from the Senior Executives of the International Council of
Cruise Lines, July 27, 1999, http://www.iccl.org/pressroom/pressl4.cfm (stating all
member cruise lines adopted unified standard and purporting cruise industry
helps appropriate authorities prosecute crimes "to the fullest extent of the law...
to ensure that perpetrators of crime are brought to justice").
101. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 46 (noting meetings held con-
sistently for last ten years).
102. See id. (informing committees that security personnel are trained in mar-
itime security and crime scene preservation basics).
103. See id. at 47-49 (describing how security personnel maintain security on
board ships twenty-four hours per day and are aided by surveillance cameras).
104. See id. at 56-57 (asserting that cruise line followed protocol in dealing
with Smith case). For further discussion of the Smith case, see supra notes 3, 15
and infra notes 133, 138 and accompanying text.
2007]
17
Tomlinson: Smooth Sailing - Navigating the Sea of Law Applicable to the Crui
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
144 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
person is still missing.' 0 5 Also, ships generally have a makeshift jail
on board.10 6
IV. FUTURE DIRECTION OF U.S. MARITIME LAw
The law applicable to cruise lines can be strengthened. In fact,
Congress held hearings in December 2005 and March 2006 to eval-
uate the current state of the law, how it could be improved, and
whether it should in fact be improved.' 0 7 Some measures the U.S.
could take are more controversial than others. 10 8 For example, it
might be more acceptable for the U.S. to effectuate change
through the SOLAS Convention, rather than unilaterally imposing
stringent regulation upon the industry, which might further en-
hance its reputation of overstepping its boundaries in the global
arena.' 0 9 Taking no action to strengthen the U.S.'s jurisdiction,
however, could prove detrimental to American citizens both at sea
and at home." 0 The ICCL maintains that it "fully acknowledges
these incidents [of crime on board and missing persons and] ...
reports any such incident to the proper authorities and cooperates
105. See BRIEFING MEMORANDUM, supra note 18, at 11-12 (explaining ship will
communicate passenger's last known location and ship's approximate location at
that time to Coast Guard so appropriate area of sea can be searched).
106. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 75 (stating ships have either
isolation cabin or designated cabin with posted guard). Cruise officials were reluc-
tant to disclose extensive details regarding their security measures as part of a pub-
lic record. See id. at 60, 67 (arguing it may "potentially compromise the security
plans").
107. See id. at 3 ("According to the industry experts, a wide range of criminal
activities, including drug smuggling, sexual assaults, piracy and terrorism threatens
security of maritime travel and trade." (quoting Representative Shays)). The
stated purpose of the first hearing was to examine "the complex web of laws, trea-
ties, regulations and commercial practices meant to protect lives and property in
an increasingly dangerous world." Id. (noting multiple countries might assert ju-
risdiction depending on incident in question); see also Congressional Hearing II,
supra note 6, at 1 ("Today, we continue our examination of the intricate web of
treaties, laws, regulations, and industrial practices intended to protect lives, rights,
and property in the maritime realm." (quoting Representative Shays)). For a brief
overview of the first hearing, see infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text. For a
brief overview of the second hearing, see infra notes 124-29 and accompanying
text.
108. For a further discussion on the U.S.'s possible methods of enforcing its
jurisdiction more broadly, see infra notes 132-83 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., International Maritime Organization FAQ supra note 44 (crediting
U.S. Coast Guard with implementation of fire safety amendments to SOLAS Con-
vention). For a further discussion on Canada's somewhat unilateral regulation of
the cruise industry, see infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
110. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 25 (implying weak domestic
port security puts all Americans at risk).
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in any investigations." '11 Section A briefly summarizes the recent
Congressional hearings. 112 Section B addresses the possibility of
enhancing the FBI's resources and lowering its current minimum
threshold for responding to an alleged crime at sea.'1 3 Section C
suggests that requiring a continued U.S. law enforcement presence
aboard cruises may help secure American passengers' safety at
sea.1 14 Finally, Section D explores the possibility of developing new
U.S. laws applicable to the cruise industry or, alternatively, ex-
panding upon existing applicable law. 115
A. Congressional Hearings on International Maritime Security
On December 13, 2005, the House of Representatives' Govern-
ment Reform Committee, the National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations Subcommittee, and the Criminal Jus-
tice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources Subcommittee held their
first joint hearing on international maritime security. 116 U.S. Rep-
resentative Christopher Shays (R-CT) chaired the hearing he called
in response to the "growing manifest of unexplained disappear-
ances, unsolved crimes and brazen acts of lawlessness on the high
seas."1 17 The witnesses who testified included representatives from
111. ICCL, ICCL Statement: Congressional Hearing, Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.
iccl.org/pressroom/pressrelease.cfm?type=a&whichrel=83 (acknowledging U.S.
federal and state authorities may investigate cruise ship crimes domestically, and
FBI may investigate and prosecute such crimes involving Americans internation-
ally, unlike crimes occurring on land of other countries). But see Congressional
Hearing II, supra note 6, at 132 ("[T]hat lack of accountability seems to be a by-
product of either the companies thumbing their noses at Federal law, or simply
that there is a legal twilight zone where they can pick and choose what laws they
will follow." (quoting Ira Leonard, passenger who experienced sizeable theft while
on board cruise ship)).
112. For a further discussion providing an overview of the Congressional
hearings held regarding international maritime security, see infra notes 116-29 and
accompanying text.
113. For a further discussion on using the FBI to regulate the cruise line in-
dustry more stringently, see infra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
114. For a further discussion on the prospect of requiring a continued Ameri-
can law enforcement presence on board cruises carrying American passengers, see
infra notes 145-59 and accompanying text.
115. For a further discussion on the possibility of expanding relevant Ameri-
can legislation regulating the cruise line industry, see infra notes 162-83 and ac-
companying text.
116. See BRIEFING MEMORANDUM, supra note 18 (providing relevant briefing
documents to committees' and subcommittees' members).
117. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting Representative
Shays's opening statement). Representative Shays continued:
What information is given to passengers on the risks of international
travel by sea? How are missing person reports investigated? How and
when is it determined if a crime is involved? How are jurisdictional con-
flicts resolved? Are there better practices in technology that should be
2007]
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the Coast Guard, Navy, FBI, ICCL, and individual cruise lines. 11 8
The families of those who disappeared from cruise ships and vic-
tims of other cruise ship incidents did not testify at this hearing. 119
Instead, they testified at the subsequent hearing in March 2006.120
The first hearing was mainly exploratory. The purpose was to in-
quire about the protection and safety of American passengers at sea
and both the legal and industry procedures that apply when there is
a missing person possibly linked to a crime.1 2' The hearing's out-
come included several requests for detailed information regarding
security procedures and statistics from cruise industry officials, an
agreement to develop formal requirements for reporting incidents
at sea, and plans to hold private hearings on sensitive security pro-
cedures. 122 Legislation was not proposed at the time because the
hearing was held only to determine whether there is a problem that
the U.S. should or even can address through legislation. 123
The second hearing, held in March 2006, focused on the lack
of uniform standards regarding both incident reporting and secur-
ity procedures to be followed after an incident occurs. 124 Victims,
used to protect passengers in the alluring but unforgiving marine
environment?
Id. at 4 (asking "those most involved in responding to maritime crisis to describe
current legal and operational security standards").
118. See id. at 2-3 (listing witnesses present to testify).
119. See id. at 11 (suggesting it was best for families to testify later at separate
hearing).
120. See International Cruise Victims, Families of Victims and Victims of Cruise
Lines Testify in Upcoming Congressional Hearing, Feb. 24, 2006, http://www.interna-
tionalcruisevictims.org/News/ICVPress/tabid/64/ctl/Details/mid/384/ItemID/
59/Default.aspx ("The purpose of the hearing is to examine the effectiveness of
current regimes governing international maritime security, including law enforce-
ment, passenger security and incident investigation.").
121. See BRIEFING MEMORANDUM, supra note 18, at 3 (setting forth two main
hearing issues). The official issues were phrased as follows: "What decision-making
procedures and processes are in place to determine the extent to which the US
[sic] government responds to a ship being attacked by terrorists or pirates? What
jurisdictional conflicts occur when United States citizens traveling on a foreign
flagged vessel are involved in a criminal incident?" Id. (providing background on
incidents at sea and relevant law). The briefing memorandum also set forth spe-
cific questions the witnesses were asked to address. See id. at 8-9 (separating ques-
tions into two sets, one for each panel of witnesses).
122. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 70 (proposing further action);
see also International Cruise Victims Organization, supra note 5 (providing updated
information on official developments regarding cruise industry).
123. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 3 (inquiring about current law
in place regarding cruise industry and its application).
124. See, e.g., Congressional Hearing II, supra note 6, at 137 (asserting that pas-
sengers did not know how to report passenger overboard and cruise staff "seemed
somewhat confused" about procedure to follow in response to report of passenger
overboard (quoting Brian Mulvaney, friend of girl who died while cruising)). Mr.
Mulvaney is a family friend of the O'Briens, who lost their fifteen-year-old daughter
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experts, and industry representatives testified and answered ques-
tions. 125 Speakers openly and repeatedly questioned the cruise in-
dustry's motivation to report accurate crime statistics to U.S.
agencies. 12 6 Specifically, participants debated whether or not statu-
tory requirements to report incidents already exist. 127 Interna-
tional Cruise Victims submitted a list of suggested improvements to
aid passenger safety and security, including provisions on required
background checks for crewmembers, law enforcement presence
on board, securing crime scenes, structural enhancements, surveil-
lance cameras, security bracelets, procedures for missing or over-
board passengers, rape investigations, bad weather, cruise line
accountability, and congressional intervention. 128 The second
hearing concluded with Representative Shays requesting that: (1)
the cruise lines investigate what legal requirements are already in
while on a cruise because she was served more than ten drinks by the cruise's
bartenders and consequently fell overboard. See id. at 119 (quoting Brian Mulva-
ney). "[T]his is an industry that is not used to visible consumer complaints, and as
the industry continues to grow, they will need to find a more uniform standardized
security standard." Id. at 5 (quoting Representative Dennis Kucinich and positing
reason for cruise industry's lack of standards).
125. See id. at 1-2 (indicating testimony was intended to further illuminate "an
unpredictable combination of facts, circumstance, and happenstance that may or
may not mean the protections of U.S. laws are available to those in peril on the
sea" (quoting Representative Shays)).
126. See id. at 7 (" [T]he number of crimes and incidents aboard cruise ships
which was not disclosed until two congressional subcommittees demanded them
and the reliability of that data leads Congress to suspect that the whole truth is not
being told." (quoting Representative Dennis Kucinich)). The cruise industry re-
ceived negative publicity in the mid-1990s for lying to the U.S. government, as well
as the public, about environmental law violations, which resulted in several felony
convictions and fines. See id. at 150 ("Yet this is the same industry that currently
U.S. citizens rely upon to, 'voluntarily report crimes,' as well as to voluntarily im-
plement adequate security aboard the ships, and to adequately conduct investiga-
tions of any allegations of crimes aboard their cruise ships." (quoting Brett
Rivkind, maritime attorney)).
127. See id. at 181 (stating Congress passed legislation in 1998 requiring "all
ships, regardless of registry, sailing to or from a U.S. port, to report any felony that
occurs in a place subject to U.S. jurisdiction to the FBI" (quoting Lawrence W.
Kaye, maritime attorney)). But see id. at 217-18 (quoting Representative Shays and
Attorney Brett Rivkind and noting neither U.S. Coast Guard nor president of Royal
Caribbean Cruise Line believes there is any statutory requirement for cruise lines
to report crimes). Kaye was referring to a section in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. See Security of Passenger Vessels, 33 C.F.R. 120 (1998) (requiring owner,
operator, charterer, or security officer of passenger vessel to report all felonies
committed on board to FBI). The U.S. Coast Guard, however, interprets this pro-
vision as applicable only when the vessel is within U.S. waters. See Congressional
Hearing II, supra note 6, at 264-65 (supplying letter from U.S. Coast Guard
Admiral).
128. See Congressional Hearing II, supra note 6, at 46-48 (setting forth recom-
mendations for improved passenger security, some of which were discussed further
during course of hearing).
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place for reporting crimes; (2) what the cruise lines voluntarily do
beyond those requirements; (3) what statistics on crimes the cruise
lines have maintained for insurance purposes; and (4) the feasibil-
ity of implementing the International Cruise Victims' suggestions
for improvement. 129
On June 28, 2006, Representative Shays introduced the Cruise
Line Accurate Safety Statistics Act ("CLASS Act") to Congress. 130
The purpose of the Act is "[lt] o require the owner of a cruise ship
... to report ... crimes that occur on the cruise ship in which a
citizen of the United States was a victim .... -131 The following
elaborates on some suggested improvements to U.S. cruise industry
regulation.
B. Lower the FBI's Minimum Threshold &
Enhance Its Resources
In the Smith case, newlywed George Smith disappeared from
aboard a cruise ship in the Mediterranean Sea while on his honey-
moon. 132 One of the most pressing questions arising after George
Smith's disappearance is why the U.S. was not involved in either
investigating the alleged crime scene or in collecting evidence. 133
129. See id. at 255-57 (quoting Representative Shays and requesting formal
response from cruise lines within month from date of hearing).
130. See International Cruise Victims, Cruise Line Accurate Safety Statistics Act
(CLASS Act) Bill Introduced with Bipartisan Support, July 7, 2006, http://www.interna-
tionalcruisevictims.org/Home/tabid/36/ctl/Details/mid/385/ItemID/164/De-
fault.aspx (describing Act as product of "relentless efforts" of International Cruise
Victims since its formation).
131. Cruise Line Accurate Safety Statistics Act, H.R. 5707, 109th Cong. (2006)
(legislating requirement to report crimes and other information, inspection of
cruise ships, disclosures by cruise lines, penalty, and definitions). As of the date of
publication, the Act was pending within the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, which referred it to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation. See The Library of Congress: Thomas, H.R. 5707, http:/
/thomas.loc.gov/ (search "Search Bill Text: Bill Number" for "H.R. 5707"; then
follow "Bill Summary and Status" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (setting
forth major congressional actions taken upon Act thus far).
132. For a further discussion on the Smith case, see supra notes 3, 15, 104 and
infra notes 133, 138 and accompanying text.
133. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 41 (stating ship docked in
Turkey and allowed passengers and crewmembers to disembark as usual, poten-
tially removing crucial evidence from ship). Turkish authorities were rushed off
the ship before completing their investigation so the ship could get to the next
scheduled port on time. See id. The cruise line maintains it contacted the FBI to
investigate, secured the scene, thoroughly searched the ship, interviewed
crewmembers and passengers with possible knowledge, and collected as much evi-
dence as possible, which it turned over to the FBI. See id. at 50 (disputing allega-
tions that cruise line improperly handled Smith case). Further, the ICCL's
president maintains that Turkish officials would have been welcome to stay on
board and travel with the ship if they had thought it was necessary and that the FBI
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The FBI's ability to intervene in a crime investigation at sea involv-
ing Americans depends on many factors, including: the type of
crime, the Ship's location when the crime was committed, the
ship's departure and arrival ports, the ship's country of registration,
the citizenships of the perpetrator and victim, the laws of other
countries with potential interests, the U.S.'s political relationship
with those countries, and the applicable international law.' 34 The
FBI currently operates approximately fifty-nine offices worldwide,
which determine whether the U.S. has jurisdiction to investigate an
alleged crime and whether it will require the involvement of other
law enforcement authorities, either from the U.S. or foreign coun-
tries.13 5 If it can investigate the alleged crime, the FBI begins once
it is reasonable and practical to do so. 1s 6
Interestingly, the FBI maintains certain minimum thresholds
that must be overcome before it will open a case file and participate
in the investigation. 3 7 For example, in the Smith case, the FBI ap-
parently declined involvement and instead ceded authority to Turk-
would have been welcome to board if it so desired. See id. at 80 (claiming cruise
industry's policy is to "fully cooperate").
134. See id. at 12 (explaining any time U.S. asserts jurisdiction beyond its terri-
torial waters, it necessarily encroaches upon at least one other country's sover-
eignty). For diplomatic reasons, the U.S. must carefully choose which criminal
incidents against American cruise passengers to investigate and prosecute. See id.
(cautioning that treaties with some countries may affect ability and sensibility of
U.S. involvement).
135. See id. at 13 (clarifying that when ship will dock or has docked in foreign
port, FBI must depend on cooperation of foreign authorities conducting investiga-
tion, though FBI will help as much as possible in order to protect American citi-
zens and interests).
136. See id. (verifying FBI will conduct interviews, collect evidence, and prose-
cute case in U.S. when appropriate, either alone or with cooperation of other
countries). Most countries allow the U.S. to take an active role in the investigation
of an alleged crime at sea involving an American citizen. See id. at 13-15 (articulat-
ing U.S. government's response depends on timely notification of criminal threat
and communication with available law enforcement resources in proximity to
scene). When a criminal threat occurs within U.S. territorial waters, the U.S. Coast
Guard may become involved. See id. at 15 (claiming Coast Guard has prevented
over 300,000 pounds of cocaine from entering U.S. and captured over 360
smugglers).
137. See id. at 57 (noting FBI has communicated these thresholds to cruise
industry and when incident does not meet threshold, cruise ship must report inci-
dent to another authority, such as port where ship docks). Individual states some-
times become involved in this manner. See id. (revealing FBI's standing agreement
with cruise industry regarding incidents that occur in areas with few FBI resources,
such as Alaska). For example, the FBI will not open a case file for a theft unless
the amount stolen exceeds $10,000; therefore, a cruise ship will not report a theft
to the FBI unless it exceeds that amount. See id. at 65 (clarifying that theft may still
be reported to authorities other than FBI).
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ish officials. 138 A related hindrance to the FBI's involvement is that
the FBI must actually be notified before it can become involved,
much less become involved in a timely manner. 1 39 Sometimes, noti-
fication of any law enforcement agency, American or otherwise, de-
pends on whether the passenger requests it.140
A significant impediment to the FBI's ability to collect evi-
dence when an alleged crime occurs is that the first law enforce-
ment agency on the scene, regardless of its country of origin, must
immediately secure the scene and then determine whether to in-
volve other countries' law enforcement agencies.1 4' Even if the FBI
is notified, it may take some time for the U.S. to decide to become
involved in or lead an investigation. 14 2 Once the FBI relinquishes
its right of involvement in an investigation to another country's au-
thorities, that country becomes the sole decision-maker. 143 Theo-
retically, if the U.S. had more FBI officials stationed globally, and
perhaps some stationed at sea, it would more often be the first
country to respond. 144
138. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 77, 80 (acknowledging FBI
made no request to take any action, other than what cruise line did to involve
Turkish officials, and maintained presence at Turkish consulate that day). The
FBI's policy is "to defer to local police authorities, working in conjunction with the
FBI, to conduct the initial investigation and turn over the results to the FBI."
Royal Caribbean International, Press Release, Jan. 27, 2006, http://www.royalcaib-
bean.com/ourCompany/pressCenter/pressReleases/info.do-jsessionid=0000SVr
F6bLnQpM6st508mg5ebu: 10kohi76p?prDate=01-27-2006&prCode=A (dispelling
popular myths regarding Royal Caribbean's handling of George Smith case and
mentioning FBI confirmed policy at December 2005 congressional hearing on in-
ternational maritime security).
139. See Christopher Elliott, Summer Cruises: Crime; Mystery at Sea: Who Polices
the Ships?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at 59 (reporting ship's security officer has
discretion over whether particular crime is "serious" enough to report to FBI).
140. See id. (mentioning passengers may take initiative in reporting crime to
U.S. or foreign local authorities if ship's security officers decline or fail to do so).
141. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 18 (confirming that U.S. may
certainly respond to any ship's call for help in dealing with life-threatening
incidents).
142. See id. at 78 (imparting FBI may allow another country's authorities to
decide whether to preserve potential crime scene or instead to allow ship to con-
tinue its travels).
143. See id. at 79 (verifying that if FBI asserted its authority and gave direc-
tions regarding investigation of Smith case, cruise line would have cooperated
fully). One cruise line official said that as far as he knew, the FBI had never been
denied "full access at their request." Id. The official claimed ships have been
delayed for investigation every time the FBI deemed necessary. See id. (pointing
out further nonoccurrence of flag state interfering with U.S.'s jurisdiction involv-
ing U.S. citizen at sea).
144. See id. at 13 (conveying number of FBI's global offices will increase over
next few years).
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C. Require a Continued U.S. Law Enforcement Presence on
Board Cruise Ships Carrying American Citizens
Currently, U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, including
the FBI, Navy, and Coast Guard, must obtain permission from a
cruise ship's flag country before beginning a criminal investigation;
U.S. agents cannot even board a cruise ship that may be the scene
of a crime committed by or against an American citizen if the ship
is located beyond U.S. waters. 145 If the ship is located within U.S.
waters, however, American criminal law unquestionably applies.' 4 6
In addition, a continued American law enforcement presence
on board cruise ships is desirable because cruise lines resist the idea
of installing complete video surveillance systems on board. 1 47 Also,
cruise lines oppose arming their security officers. 148 Cruise officials
have, however, requested armed escort ships when traveling
through potentially dangerous areas. 14 9 An armed U.S. law en-
forcement officer on board would perhaps be more suitable, espe-
cially because armed security guards are somewhat commonplace
in the U.S. 150 Requiring cruise ships to carry federal law enforce-
145. See id. at 6 (noting most cruise ships sail under foreign flags and are not
subject to U.S. jurisdiction unless they are at U.S. port or in U.S. territorial waters);
see also Congressional Hearing II, supra note 6, at 180 (quoting Lawrence Kaye, mari-
time attorney, and stating he is unaware of any instance in which FBI was denied
permission to investigate because foreign-flagged ships usually welcome FBI
aboard "with open arms").
146. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 32 (maintaining that both
common and statutory law would apply to cruise line within U.S. waters that either
failed to report felony or was guilty of criminal negligence when contributing to or
responding to report of potential criminal incident).
147. See id. at 73 (citing massive amount of area coverage required and possi-
ble privacy concerns regarding private balconies).
148. See Cruise Ships Vulnerable to Attacks, Nov. 9, 2005, http://www.military.
com/NewsContent/0,13319,80133,00.html (quoting president of maritime secur-
ity consulting company and opining armed cruise line security personnel may pro-
ject wrong image to some passengers). A public relations official suggested
responding too aggressively to a minor problem might make the incident both
more frightening and newsworthy than warranted. See id. (pointing out that offi-
cial does not work with cruise lines).
149. See Matt Cherry & Amanda Moyer, Cruise Liner Outruns Armed Pirate Boats,
Nov. 5, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/11/05/somalia.pirates/
index.html (explaining this request is in response to recent pirate attack off
Somalian coast).
150. See Wikipedia, Security Guard, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-
guard (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (indicating armed security officers are standard
for government and military sites, banks and financial institutions, nuclear power
plants, vehicle patrol officers, and many non-government sites).
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ment officers is an idea presently circulating among attorneys in-
volved in cases against cruise lines. 151
Alternatively, the U.S. could require cruise lines to arm their
security guards because these guards derive their authority from a
contract with their employer, rather than from a governmental en-
tity.15 2 This allows them more flexibility in effectively performing
their duties.1 53 Moreover, because the guards would not be govern-
ment agents, they would not be subject to the same regulations,
such as the requirement of probable cause before questioning a
potential suspect; thus, they could serve as a first line of defense
before American law enforcement agents reach the scene. 154 Such
guards, as private actors, would still be subject to tort suits for any
false arrests or other illegal actions, which would likely prevent
guards from enforcing the law too aggressively. 155
This system is analogous to the federal air marshals that have
flown on some U.S. flights since 1968.156 Marshals, however, are
federal law enforcement agents. 157 Created in the 1960s, the air
marshal program was designed to counter hijacking attempts and
safeguard flights and airports from other kinds of crimes.' 58 After
151. See Martinez, supra note 4 (suggesting team of federal law enforcement
officers on board could independently conduct investigation when crime occurs).
152. See Security Guard, supra note 150 (noting states often require additional
training for security guards carrying weapons).
153. See id. (mentioning security guards are often confused with police of-
ficers because of similar uniforms and duties). This contract creates an "agent of
the owner" relationship, giving the guard much discretion in performing his or
her duties. See id. (remarking police officers technically have almost no discretion
and must arrest people for minor offenses, whereas armed guards could choose
whether to make citizen's arrest in similar circumstances).
154. See id. (suggesting possibility for U.S. to "deputize" security guards, grant-
ing them additional powers).
155. See id. (noting police officers are not subject to tort actions because they
are granted civil immunity).
156. Compare generally id., with Transportation Security Administration, Federal
Air Marshal Service, http://www.tsa.gov/lawenforcement/people/index.shtm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2006) (describing federal air marshal position).
157. See Federal Air Marshal Service, supra note 156 (stating mission is to
"[p]romote confidence in our Nation's civil aviation system through the effective
deployment of Federal Air Marshals to detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts target-
ing U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers and crews"); see also Annie Schleicher, Air
Marshal Program Expanded to Buses, Trains, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/news
hour/extra/features/july-dec05/airmarshals12-12.html (describing air marshal's
2005 shooting of unarmed man claiming he had bomb in his backpack). Air mar-
shals train for higher handgun accuracy than any other federal law enforcement
officers. See id. (reporting air marshals are trained in behavioral observation, in-
timidation tactics, and use of self defense in small areas).
158. See Wikipedia, Federal Air Marshal Service, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
FederalAir Marshal (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (describing history, training,
practice, and equipment of air marshals).
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September 11, 2001, air marshal positions increased from approxi-
mately thirty to several thousand. 159 Recently, the Travel Security
Administration began an effort to expand air marshals' role beyond
protecting airline travel safety. 160 The exact number of air marshals
currently in service remains classified, but some believe there are
not enough to support expansion. 161
D. Enact New Legislation or Expand Upon Existing Legislation
Regulating the Cruise Industry
Although few cruise ships are American-owned or controlled,
the U.S. could coerce the industry to adopt standards the U.S.
deems necessary because Americans generate more than half of the
industry's overall business.' 62 For example, the U.S. could simply
bar cruise ships from docking at U.S. ports. 163 This conduct is per-
missible because the U.S. retains exclusive jurisdiction over the
twelve miles of sea immediately surrounding its borders.164 The
U.S. could probably completely bar cruise ships from passing
through its waters if cruise lines refuse to implement U.S. regula-
tions because countries can deny this right to ships if they believe a
threat to national security exists. 165 Although the U.S. did not sign
the Convention, it can still rely on the customary international law
previously discussed to justify its decisions regarding cruise lines.166
159. See Schleicher, supra note 157 (relaying that Transportation Security Ad-
ministration received 200,000 applications immediately after September 11, 2001).
160. See Leslie Miller, Air Marshals to Expand Their Mission, Dec. 14, 2005,
http://www.breitbart.com/news/2OO5/12/14/D8EG3LTOO.html (recounting
three-day nationwide test program in mass transit facilities).
161. See id. (sharing one pilot's assertions that "air marshals ought to stick to
airplanes").
162. For a further discussion providing the cruise industry's passenger statis-
tics, see supra note 41 and accompanying text. Congress has already indicated an
interest in asserting the U.S.'s expectations of cruise ship safety when carrying
American passengers. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 8 (remarking
Congress would first like to examine industry's own regulation and whether U.S. is
currently doing enough to regulate ships).
163. For a further discussion summarizing U.S. sovereignty over the ocean
immediately surrounding its coastline, see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying
text.
164. See Proclamation No. 5928, 3 C.F.R. 547 (1988), reprinted in 48 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2000) (declaring U.S. recognizes territorial sea of twelve nautical miles).
165. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 513 (1987) (ex-
plaining all countries' ships have right of innocent passage through other coun-
tries' territorial waters). Passage is innocent if it is not harmful to the territorial
country's "peace, good order, or security." Id. (stating country may not suspend
privilege of innocent passage unless essential to national security).
166. For a further discussion on the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, see supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. For a further discussion
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The U.S. could follow Canada's example by enacting regula-
tions applicable to all cruise ships visiting its ports. 167 Canada's
Marine Transportation Security Act sets forth specific security re-
quirements, including mandatory company and ship security of-
ficers, detailed records of security training and drills, and a detailed
vessel security plan. 168 No evidence shows that these regulations
have harmed Canada's cruise industry. 169
Another avenue for the U.S. is tracking criminal trends on
board ships and requiring employee training in response to specific
types of crime. 170 The IMO has the authority to inspect any train-
ing programs the U.S. might implement.17' The IMO already
adopted an initiative to develop training programs and would likely
welcome any American guidance in light of the U.S.'s demon-
strated initiative and interest in heightened security standards. 72
The U.S. has already expressed an interest in more carefully
monitoring the industry.173 Representative Shays, who chaired the
congressional hearing on international maritime security, asserts, "I
think we need honest statistics, and I think the way we get honest
statistics is if we require it under law, with penalties if they don't
on the applicable customary international law, see supra note 67 and accompany-
ing text.
167. See Teresa Anderson, Cruise Control, Security Management Online, http:/
/www.securitymanagement.com/library/000812.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006)
(conveying that regulations establish security requirements for cruise lines and
port authorities).
168. See Marine Transportation Security Regulations, S.C. 1994, c. 40 (1994),
available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2004/20040602/html/sor144-e.
html#a (declaring failure to implement Canadian regulations would likely be con-
sidered violation of international commitment to improve maritime safety and
security).
169. See Association of Canadian Port Authorities, Industry Information: Cana-
dian Port Industry, http://www.acpa-ports.net/industry/industry.html (last visited
Sept. 17, 2006) (citing cruise industry's continued growth nationwide).
170. See Anderson, supra note 167 (describing cruise lines' individual initia-
tives in dealing with trend of sexual assaults at sea).
171. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 52 (confirming that U.S. is mem-
ber of International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, which allows IMO to oversee work done by member
governments in ensuring they meet Convention's requirements).
172. See IMO Adapts Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures, supra note 69
(describing SOLAS amendment inviting IMO to provide training guidance for se-
curity officers and performance standards). The conference that developed the
amendments specifically requested that outside entities contribute to maritime
and port security activities. See id. (stating this contribution would help developing
countries who may not have resources to develop their own programs).
173. For a further discussion on the cruise industry's questionable crime sta-
tistics, see supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
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give [them] to us."'1 74 For example, the IMO previously imple-
mented an anti-piracy campaign which, in part, requires members
to report piracy statistics. 175 It appears that many cruise lines would
be willing to implement this policy because of their strong interest
in protecting passengers' safety at sea. 176 This is especially true be-
cause cruise lines realize that if passengers were to lose confidence
in cruise ships' safety, the cruise industry would suffer financially. 177
The U.S. could also address the lack of American law requiring
cruise ships to preserve evidence from alleged crime scenes.' 78
There are no external standards imposed upon the cruise lines
when there may have been a crime committed on board. 179 The
international law governing the exchange of evidence between
countries can be complex and too cumbersome to be effective. 180
It may be technically impossible for the law to be effective if there is
simply no evidence to obtain.' 8 ' Also, Congress acknowledges that
it should define which crimes should be reported and set require-
ments for reporting them. 182 Finally, the U.S. may want to consider
174. Martinez, supra note 4. "I want to know how big the problem is." Id.
(quoting Representative Shays). This is in response to the common sense notion
that the U.S. should not amend or enact new legislation regulating the industry
unless there is truly a problem to remedy.
175. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 52 (emphasizing IMO is fully
capable of successfully collecting global statistics on particular problem and thus
could collect similar statistics on cruise ship crime).
176. See Anderson, supra note 167 ("[w]e knew that an incident could be even
more traumatic when it happens on a cruise ship .... Our main concern was to
protect the safety of our passengers and crew." (quoting cruise line official)).
177. See Larger Ships, supra note 36 (asserting that safety is "vital concern" be-
cause cruise ships have very high profile and poor safety record might undermine
success).
178. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 19 (observing that there is no
requirement to preserve evidence of crime involving U.S. citizen if crime occurs in
international waters).
179. See id. at 24 (communicating that U.S. Navy has established basic proto-
cols with cruise lines regarding general safety on board). The U.S. Coast Guard
has helped the industry develop a security officer program, but there is no stan-
dard for reporting crimes involving Americans to U.S. authorities. See id.
180. See generally James Chalmers, Comment, The Hague Evidence Convention
and Discovery Inter Partes: Trial Court Decisions Post-Aerospatiale, 8 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 189 (2000) (summarizing Hague Evidence Convention, which is interna-
tional treaty initiated by U.S. that governs exchange of evidence between signatory
countries, and arguing that treaty still does not resolve all problems related to
international evidence collection).
181. See Cowan, supra note 3 (reporting evidence was destroyed); Cruise Cover
Up?, supra note 1 (emphasizing no attempt to collect evidence and donation of
victim's belongings to charity).
182. See Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 28 (positing more accurate
crime statistics would help Congress determine whether and how to further regu-
late cruise industry). The Chairman questioned the possibility of a requirement
that all missing person cases aboard cruise ships "be treated as a potential crime
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becoming a signatory to the Convention in order to influence its
potential amendment, enforcement, and application. 183
V. CONCLUSION
The cruise industry boasts a glamorous and alluring history,
not to mention a reputation of providing carefree vacations.184 The
recent shocking reports of disappearing passengers may unjustly
distort the cruise industry's actual safety record.' 85 On the other
hand, these stories reveal serious holes in the industry's protocols
for responding to missing person reports.' 86 At the very least,
cruise lines could be more sensitive and sympathetic toward the vic-
tims' families. 187
Because the number of passengers who have disappeared
seems low, relative to both the total number of passengers who go
on cruises per year and the total number of people who go missing
in the U.S. every day, it is difficult to argue that serious industry
reform or oversight is truly necessary. 188 Nevertheless, given the
amount of business the U.S. provides to cruise lines, it is reasonable
for the U.S. to mandate even higher standards for the industry. 189
until determined otherwise." See id. at 42 (indicating some doubt as to whether
this could legally be done and whether it should be done).
183. For a further discussion concerning the U.S.'s status as a non-signatory
to the Convention, see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
184. For a brief overview of the cruise industry's history and modern reputa-
tion, see supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
185. For a sample of these sensationalist stories, see supra notes 1-3 and ac-
companying text. For a further discussion of the cruise industry's safety record,
see supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Congressional Hearing II, supra note 6, at 258 (quoting Captain
William Wright, senior vice president of Marine Operations for Royal Caribbean
International). Captain Wright argues:
"Typically, when you go and do an investigation ... you discover almost
always there is an error chain. Very rarely is it one single mistake that one
single person or crew member made that resulted in something happen-
ing. If you go back and do the detail work, you are going to find it is a
series of things where the system failed, there was a systemic failure. And
you need to understand that. That is something that we do on a regular
basis, and I think the chairman's subcommittee is helping to that end."
Id. For a further discussion on the cruise industry's procedures when a passenger
is reported missing, see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
187. For examples of cruise lines' responses to victims' families, see supra
notes 1-3 and accompanying text. See also Cruise Bruise, The Black & Blue Report,
http://www.cruisebruise.com/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (providing
victims' stories).
188. For a further discussion on the cruise industry's missing persons statis-
tics, see supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
189. For suggested improvements to the cruise industry's practices, see supra
notes 132-83 and accompanying text.
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Higher standards seem all the more reasonable in light of the com-
plex law that applies to the industry under different circumstances,
making it difficult for American passengers to know what they can
expect and what rights they have when something goes amiss at
sea. 190 This is what the International Cruise Victims Organization
and Representative Shays hope to remedy through the CLASS
Act. 191
One thing Americans need not worry about when cruising is
whether pirates will successfully attack the ship. 192 Cruise ships are
traditionally hard to attack and are not the most attractive target for
pirates. 193 Nonetheless, cruise lines prepare for the possibility by
increasing security at night and training crewmembers on attack
prevention. 194
For now, the best advice any cruise ship passenger can heed is
to use common sense and be aware of his or her surroundings.1 95
For example, in the U.S., there are laws prohibiting bartenders
from serving drinks to intoxicated people, but there are no such
laws at sea. 196 Michael Crye, President of the International Council
of Cruise Lines, stresses: "People should not assume because they're
on a ship that somebody is going to be there always to take care of
you. You are onboard a vessel with sometimes up to several thou-
sand people, and not everybody on the ship is going to be your best
friend. ' 19 7 Perhaps Herman Melville inadvertently summarized
190. For a further discussion setting forth the law and regulations applicable
to the cruise industry, see supra notes 42-106 and accompanying text.
191. For a further discussion on the CLASS Act, see supra notes 130-31 and
accompanying text.
192. See Anderson, supra note 167 (noting pirates are not found in cruise
lines' major areas of operation); see also Congressional Hearing I, supra note 1, at 65
(reporting recent attack on Seabourn Spirit was first known pirate attack against
cruise ship in over twenty years).
193. See Anderson, supra note 167 ("Cruise ships are well-lit, fast, and hard to
board." (quoting cruise line official)). Pirates generally target commercial ships
with small crews and valuable cargo on board. See id. (noting pirates seek least
amount of resistance when targeting ships to attack).
194. See id. (describing cruise lines' response to potential attack); see also BBC
News, Cruise Ship Repels Somali Pirates, Nov. 5, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/4409662.stm (recounting how crewmembers thwarted attack).
195. See Mary Lu Abbott, Safe and Sound at Sea?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 19,
2006, available at http://www.latimes.com/travel/columnists/la-tr-cruisenewsl9feb
19,1,846641,full.column?coll=LA-travel-columnists&ctrack=l &cset=true (reporting
despite recent reports of passenger disappearances at sea, many people still con-
sider cruising safe).
196. See id. (noting cruise lines have internal rules requiring wait staff to stop
serving intoxicated passengers and claiming staff follows rules).
197. Id. ("[O]n land as well as at sea, vacationers often let their guard down
and may do things they wouldn't do at home. On ships, vacationers may think
they're in a safe zone because access is limited.").
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maritime law the best: "For a ship is a bit of terra firma cut off from
the main; it is a state in itself; and the captain is its king."198
Sarah J. Tomlinson *
198. HERMAN MELVILLE, WHITE-JACKET ch. 6 (United States Book Company)
(1850), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10712/10712.txt (providing
text of book); see also Herman Melville, Biography, http://www.poemhunter.com/
herman-melville/biography/poet-6675/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (noting Mel-
ville spent much time at sea and thus wrote extensively on sea travel, including
classic novel, Moby Dick).
* Managing Editor of Student Works, Villanova Sports & Entertainment Law
Journal. J.D. Candidate, Villanova University School of Law, 2007; M.B.A. Candi-
date, Pennsylvania State University, 2007.
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APPENDIX A 199
Country Location of Relevant Who Has
of Ship's Offense U.S. Statute Jurisdiction?
Registry
United U.S. territorial 18 U.S.C. U.S.
States waters or § 7(1)
high seas
United Territorial 18 U.S.C. U.S. concurrent
States waters of § 7(1) with host nation
foreign nation
Foreign U.S. territorial 18 U.S.C. U.S. (subject to
Nation waters § 7(1) international law
and applicable
treaties)
Foreign High seas 18 U.S.C. U.S. (subject to
Nation § 7(7) international law)
if offense is
committed by or
against U.S.
nationals
Foreign High seas, 18 U.S.C. U.S., if ship is
Nation territorial § 7(8) departing from or
waters of a arriving in the
foreign nation U.S. and offense is
committed by or
against U.S.
nationals (subject
to international
law and applicable
treaties)
199. International Maritime Security: Hearing Before the Joint Subcomms. on
Government Reform, National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations,
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 109th Cong. 10 (2005), available
at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Swecker%20Testimony.pdf (citations
and footnotes omitted) (quoting Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation).
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